The Opinionator feature in the New York Times today, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/drill-baby-drill-and-legalize-baby-leglalize/, points to a piece, http://gregor.us/uncategorized/marijuana-first-then-the-oil/, advocating the taxation of marijuana. It may be time to think that idea through.
(Bills in at least two States would tax marijuana. In
and http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/senate/186/st01/st01801.htm, would tax on the basis of potency, with rates ranging from $150 to $250 per ounce. Both bills would allow non-legislative authorities to adjust the rate (that power to adjust looks to me like a new and fresh idea):
Figuring out a rate for marijuana starts but does not end with the competing interests of (1) keeping the rate low enough to deter bootlegging thugs like that no good Marlo Stanfield on “The Wire” on the one hand and (2) maximizing revenue on the other.
First, deterring bootleggers doesn’t necessarily mean totally eliminating them. Bootlegging to avoid Federal alcohol or tobacco taxes is not one of our major problems today, so an acceptable target might be to reduce marijuana bootlegging to that order of magnitude. I wonder if the public would tolerate the level of bootlegging involved with those trucks full of cigarettes headed from low tax States to high tax States. See http://politicalcalculations.blogspot.com/2007/10/business-of-bootlegging.html
Second, maximizing revenue would follow from knowing the elasticity of demand, I guess, but only if you plug bootlegging into that analysis: elasticity analysis will tell how much consumers would buy at what prices, but not whether they would buy from a taxed source or from a bootlegger. Buying from a bootlegger would involve nonfinancial risks or costs: the danger of illegality and the risk of buying something that lacks any imprimatur of genuineness or purity. In any event, “knowing” is a euphemism for what one can understand about the elasticity here – estimating is more accurate.
Beyond those two competing interests, there’s a third consideration, that of the street price. Meanwhile, consumers of marijuana (bless their hearts) would generally be happy enough to get legalization and would not be seeking a price cut. The opponents of legalization (bless their hearts, too) think marijuana is bad for society and would resist a price cut. It’s hard to see the opponents retreating on to taxation and legalization if they foresee cheaper marijuana – and they are in the majority now, at least in Legislatures. So if the revenue-maximizing rate resulted in a lower cost to the consumer than in today’s black market (because the criminal element got no take), it’s hard to imagine that outcome working politically. Any middle ground might well keep the street price at least at current levels.